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THE CONCLUSIVE PRESUMPTION CASES:
THE SEARCH FOR A NEWER EQUAL
PROTECTION CONTINUES
Gary J. Simson*

"In strictness, there cannot be such a thing as a 'conclusive presumption.' "--Wigmore'
A hallmark of the Warren Court was its use of two essentially antithetical

2
standards of review to resolve equal protection issues. In most instances,
judicial review of legislative classifications for satisfaction of the equal protection clause would follow the traditional mode 3 of deference in the extreme,
with the Court readily straining to hypothesize legislative purposes arguably
served by the classification. During the Warren Court era, however, a "new"
5
equal protection 4 to complement this older approach clearly emerged. A diametrically opposed standard of scrutiny obtained, then, if the Court found

that the law under review deprived some persons of a "fundamental interest"6
or divided the population into groups advantaged or disadvantaged by means
of a "suspect classification."'7 Where either of these conditions was satisfied,
the typically indulgent review of state laws for comportment with the requirements of equal protection gave way to a demand for far more perfection in
* B.A., 1971; J.D., 1974, Yale.
1. 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2492, at 292 (3d cd. 1940).
2. See, e.g., McDonald v. Board of Election, 394 U.S. 802 (1969); Gallagher v.
Crown Kosher Market, 366 U.S. 617 (1961) (plurality opinion of Warren, C.J.); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
3. See, e.g., F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920); Lindsley v.
Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911); Ozan Lumber Co. v. Union County
Nat'l Bank, 207 U.S. 251 (1907). See generally Tussmann & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341 (1949).
4. See generally Karst, Invidious Discrimination: Justice Douglas and the Return
of the "Natural-Law-Due-ProcessFormula," 16 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 716 (1969).
5. For earlier signs of this development, see Takahashi v. Fish and Game Comm'n,
334 U.S. 410 (1948); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
6. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Williams v. Rhodes, 393
U.S. 23 (1968).
7. See, e.g., Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S.
1 (1967); cf. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
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classification. 8 And while laws were rarely found to run afoul of the older,
minimum rationality test,9 few laws survived the "strict scrutiny" of the new
test.10
12
1
With Justice Marshall leading the way on the Court, ' this "rigidified"'
approach to interests and classifications has come under increasing attack in
recent years. 13 Elevation of interests and classifications to fundamental and
suspect status, respectively, is ,troublesome because of the major commitment
made thereby to scrutinize all laws involving such interests and classifications,

and the almost inevitable invalidation of all such laws subjected to this intense review. On the other hand, though interests may be less than fundamental and classifications less than suspect in the Court's view, they will often
be deserving of far more protection than the usual confirmation of rationality
affords. Perhaps, then, to give these "intermediate" interests and classifications their due, no more and no less, the Court might require varying degrees

of perfection in shaping legislative means to ends depending on the impor8. To justify a law depriving certain persons of a fundamental interest, the state
must demonstrate that the measure is necessary to the accomplishment of a compelling
state interest. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969). If the state can
show a compelling reason for the deprivation, it must then go on to prove that its interest is being pursued with the least possible infringement on the fundamental right.
Where adoption of a less drastic alternative, one more discriminating in its impact, is
believed by the Court to be feasible, the law under review will be held unconstitutional.
Where a suspect classification is at issue, the state need not prove that the law is supported by a compelling interest on its part. If the classification is imperfect, however,
over- or underinclusive, the state must show that the classification selected represents
the best possible one given the time pressures for its formulation. An immediate need to
classify would thus justify imprecision in the process. Cf. Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S.
333, 334 (1968) (Black, Harlan & Stewart, JJ., concurring); Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214, 219 (1944). See generally Note, Mental Illness: A Suspect Classification?, 83 YALE L.J. 1237, 1245-52 (1974).
9. Among the few Warren Court exceptions are Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305
(1966); Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957). Earlier "irrational" classification cases
include, inter alia, Hartford Co. v. Harrison, 301 U.S. 459 (1937); Smith v. Cahoon,
283 U.S. 553 (1931); Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32 (1928).
10. The Virginia divorce law in Tancil v. Woolls, 379 U.S. 19 (1964), appears to be
the single Warren Court survivor of strict scrutiny. Suggestion of another law which
would satisfy this standard occurs in three Justices' concurrence to Lee v. Washington,
390 U.S. 333, 334 (1968) (Black, Harlan & Stewart, JJ., concurring). The orders
reviewed in the World War II internment cases, Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214 (1944), and Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943), complete the list
of exceptions to date.
11. See generally San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-110
(1973) (Marshall, J.,dissenting); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 519-21 (1970)
(Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
12. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98 (1973) (Marshall,
J.,dissenting).
13. See also Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 458-59 (1973) (White, J., concurring).
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tance of the interest affected and the degree of suspicion attending a legisla14
ture's use of the particular classification.
This vocal minority of the Court was not alone in its criticisms, moreover,
for the Court's critics, most notably Professor Gerald Gunther, 5 added vigor
to the erosion of the Warren Court's dichotomy. In his review of the Court's
1971 term, Professor Gunther not only endorsed the "sliding-scale ' 16 formula
suggested by Justice Marshall, but also attempted to demonstrate that a majority of the Court had already adopted the new test sub silentio. 17 Lower
courts were not long in explicitly applying this received wisdom,' 8 but the
Supreme Court has proved less than accommodating. Apparently anxious
to preserve its options, if not to repudiate the Gunther thesis entirely, the
Court followed with several resounding affirmations of the Warren Court's
"two-tiered"' 19 test. 20 If, then, the Court is indeed searching, as Professor
Gunther has maintained, for a "newer" equal protection to deal with interests
and classifications not sufficiently significant or untrustworthy for constitutional recognition as "fundamental" or "suspect," these recent cases indicate
at the very least that the Court has not yet settled on the sliding-scale as
the solution.
But as the sliding-scale has risen to and, it seems, fallen from prominence, 21 another mode of constitutional analysis long essentially dormant has
14. Cf. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 99 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("the constitutional and societal importance of the interest adversely affected and the recognized invidiousness of the basis upon which the particular
classification is drawn").
15. Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L.
Rexv. 1 (1972). See also Cox, The Supreme Court, 1965 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARV. L. REV. 91, 92-99
(1966); Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term-Foreword: On Protecting the
Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARv. L. REv. 7, 33-39 (1969).
16. Gunther, supra note 15, at 17-18.
17. Id. at 25-37. While Professor Gunther tried to prove this proposition with respect to the 1971 term, Justice Marshall in San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), argued its descriptive validity with respect to the Court's
equal protection decisions over the last thirty years.
18. See, e.g., Aiello v. Hansen, 359 F. Supp. 792 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (three-judge
court), rev'd sub nom. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974); Boraas v. Village of
Belle Terre, 476 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
19. Gunther, supra note 15, at 17.
20. See Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 355-56 & n.10 (1974); Village of Belle Terre
v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1974); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1, 17 (1973).
21. On the uncertain existence at any time past of sliding-scale rationality, see Note,
Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre: The New, New Equal Protection, 72 MICH. L. REv.
508, 533-36 (1974).
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experienced an unmistakable revival in the Supreme Court: the conclusive
presumption. Somewhat of a misnomer-for the essence of a "presumption"
is its rebuttable, inconclusive quality 2 2-"conclusive presumption" describes

a rule of law which irrebuttably takes B as established from proof of A. The
Court has traditionally measured the validity of a conclusive presumption
23
against the fifth and fourteenth amendments' guarantees of due process.
An understanding of the functional significance of the recent conclusive presumption cases, however, becomes possible only against the backdrop of

equal protection theory, which has already been sketched and to which I
shall return.

By elucidating the difficulties and potentialities presented by

the Court's use thus far of the conclusive presumption technique, an attempt
will be made in this article to locate the Burger Court's conclusive presumption cases within recent developments in equal protection as an alternative
to the sliding-scale in the problematic "middle zone" of equal protection review.
I.

THE NATURE OF THE EXPERIMENT

Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur24 marked the Court's fourth in-

vocation of conclusive presumption reasoning since 1972.25 In LaFleur and
22. See C.
DENCE § 2492,

MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE

§ 342, at 804 (2d ed. 1972); 9 J. WioMORm, EVI-

at 292 (3d ed. 1940).

23. See Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312 (1932); cf. Manley v. Georgia, 279 U.S.
1 (1929).
24. 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
25. Justice Rehnquist to the contrary, Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974),
does not mark the Court's fifth conclusive presumption case. The eight-member majority in Jimenez struck down as a violation of equal protection (applicable to the federal government as a matter of due process, see Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954))
a provision of the Social Security laws distinguishing among types of illegitimate children for purposes of determining eligibility for insurance benefits upon a wage-earner
parent's disability. Since the classification was not based on legitimacy of birth but instead on characteristics differentiating illegitimates from one another, cases intimating
the suspect status of legitimacy classifications, see note 72 infra, were not in point. Rationality, not perfection, in classification would thus be the standard of review applied
by the Court. In Justice Rehnquist's view, however, the Court attended to the standard's
over- and underinclusiveness with far more rigor than appropriate under a rationality
test. Accordingly, he explained the Court's review as being not rooted in equal protection theory at all but instead as a sub rosa invocation of conclusive presumption doctrine. Indeed, he could point to some language in the Court's opinion to support
this conclusive presumption characterization of it, see 407 U.S. at 639. Nevertheless,
the degree of scrutiny given the classification by the Court is not as irreconcilable with
a rational connection test and equal protection analysis as Justice Rehnquist would have
it. For whatever the descriptive validity, see note 21 supra, or current applicability, see
p. 219 supra, of his sliding-scale equal protection theory, Professor Gunther does point
to cases in the 1971 term which indicate that a rational connection test can have some
punch. See generally Gunther, supra note 15. See also Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S.
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its three predecessors, Stanley v. Illinois,26 Vlandis v. Kline,27 and United
States Department of Agriculture v. Murry,28 the Court has sought to minimize this development by explaining two cases of the past decade, Bell v.
Burson2 9 and Carrington v. Rash,3 0 in conclusive presumption terms. In
Bell, however, with a law before it requiring an uninsured driver involved
in an accident to either post security or suffer suspension of his license prior
to any determination of fault, the Court made no mention of any "conclusive
presumption." Indeed, far from analyzing the case in terms of an irrefutable
presumption of fault from proof of involvement in an accident-the Court's
retrospective characterization of Bell in Stanley31 and Vlandis32-the Court
placed the instant facts within the Goldberg v. Kelly3 3 line of authority regarding the process due a party denied government largess 34 and the obsolescence of the right/privilege doctrine.3 5 And the reliance on Carringtonwas
equally unconvincing as an attempt to fit Stanley and its successors within
the mainstream of contemporary jurisprudence. The Carrington Court analyzed the challenged Texas prohibition against the establishment of a Texas
voting residence by non-Texans in the military in strictly equal protection
terms; conclusive presumption, however, is doctrinally a due process concern.
The single reference to conclusive presumption in the case-the Court's characterization of the law's underlying premise that all non-Texans in the military do not intend to become permanent residents 36-was thus no more than
metaphorical, simply one way of emphasizing the overinclusiveness of this
measure to protect the franchise from transients. The careful scrutiny of relative perfection in classification was triggered, then, not by recognition of a
conclusive presumption but instead by the infringement of an interest of fundamental constitutional stature, voting, 37 in possible violation of the equal
protection clause.
107 (1966) (New York procedures for civil commitment of persons at end of prison
term irrational and invalid to the extent to which they differ from procedures for civil
commitment of persons not imprisoned immediately prior to attempted commitment). In
light of these developments in equal protection, then, Justice Rehnquist's characterization

of limenez as a conclusive presumption case seems misplaced.
26. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
27.
28.
29.
30.

412
413
402
380

U.S. 441 (1973).
U.S. 508 (1973).
U.S. 535 (1971).
U.S. 89 (1965).

31. 405 U.S. at 653.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

412 U.S. at 446-47.
397 U.S. 254 (1970).
See generally Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
See Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971).
380 U.S. at 96.

37. Id. ("matters close to the core of our constitutional system"). The fundamental-
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For support in precedent for its latest forays into conclusive presumption
territory, the Court must look back forty and fifty years to cases invalidating
estate tax laws which operated by the conclusive presumption that gifts made
within x years of death are made in contemplation of death . 3 As manifestations of substantive due process, however 39-a basis for judicial review frequently renounced by the Court since the 1940's 4 0-these cases provide less
than venerable support for the Court's present activities.
A.

The Cases and the Express Framework

Given this dearth of support for conclusive presumption analysis in modern
precedent, the Court's employment of this line of reasoning in Stanley v. Illinois, the earliest of the four recent conclusive presumption cases, is striking
for its matter-of-factness. Mr. Stanley, the father of three illegitimate chil-

dren, challenged an Illinois law depriving unwed fathers of their offspring
upon the mother's death. All other classes of parents would only lose custody
of their children to the state if the state could prove parental unfitness in
a neglect hearing. Although the equal protection clause offered the obvious

route for dealing with this claim of unequal treatment of persons similarly
situated 4 1-and, indeed, was endorsed as an alternative ground for decision
by four members of the seven-Justice Stanley Court4 2 -five

Justices sub-

ity of voting, affirmed in cases prior to Carrington, see, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
533, 561-62 (1964), would soon be most forcefully propounded in Harper v. Virginia
Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). On the exercise of strict scrutiny in Carrington
pursuant to a finding of a fundamental interest, see Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,
660 & n.8 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting). For an attempt to reconcile the fundamental
stature of voting with the Court's deference to voting classifications based on age, United
States citizenship, in-state residency and past commission of a felony, see Note, supra
note 8, at 1255-56 n.77.
38. Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312 (1932); Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U.S. 230
(1926). The effect of the conclusive presumption would therefore be to include such
gifts in the donor's gross estate for estate tax purposes.
39. Cf. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932); Adkins v. Children's
Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915). See also Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 467-68 (1973) (Rehnquist & Douglas, JJ., & Burger, C.J.,
dissenting).
40. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955); Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421,
423 (1952). Substantive due process may be more honored in practice, however, than
these formulaic denunciations would seem to indicate. Cf. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Ely, The Wages of Crying
Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973).
41. Neither the parties nor the Illinois Supreme Court appears to have noticed any
other constitutional problem. See Brief for Petitioner at 3, Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
645 (1972); Brief for Respondent at 10, id.; In re Stanley, 45 Ill. 2d 132, 256 N.E.2d
814 (1970).
42. 405 U.S. at 658.
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scribed to a disposition of the case according to the due process requirements
attending conclusive presumptions. Thus, the Court did not impugn the legitimacy of the state's objective-to protect the well-being of children within
its jurisdiction. The Court did find constitutional defect in the means chosen
to effectuate this purpose, however, for the law presumes as irrebuttably true
from proof of one's status as an unwed father a fact that does not necessarily
follow: that a person occupying this status is unfit to care for his children. 48
Even assuming most unmarried fathers may not be fit to bring up their children alone, some undoubtedly can effectively perform this function; and, the
Court further reasoned, due process thus demands that any individual in this
disadvantaged class have the opportunity to prove the imperfection of the presumption as regards him. The Court was careful to stress, however, that the
defect lay not in the classification per se but instead in the lack of process
given one within the disadvantaged class to escape it. Accordingly, the legislature need not abandon the presumption altogether and, indeed, could even
place the burden of its rebuttal on the persons singled out for deprivation."4
Vlandis v. Kline, the Court's next conclusive presumption case, mirrors
Stanley in both its analytic technique and the remedy prescribed. Before the
Court was the constitutionality of Connecticut's definition of "resident" for
purposes of qualification for lower tuition and other reduced fees in the state
university system. Any married student living outside the state at the time
of application or any single student living outside at any time during the year
preceding application were not "residents" within the meaning of the statute.
Thus classified, they were forced to matriculate, if they still so desired, at
the higher non-resident rates for the full time of their attendance at the
school. Their exclusion from resident status, the state contended, was designed to serve the legitimate state objective of equalizing costs between bona
fide residents and nonresidents; the legislature's theory was thus that bona
fide residents compensate for the differential in university costs by past and
future tax contributions. In the Court's view, though, a constitutional infirmity lay in presuming irrebuttably for purposes of securing this objective that
nonresidence at the time of application (.for married students) or during the
year preceding application (for single students) signifies a lack of intent to
remain permanently in Connecticut.4 5 Perhaps most students excluded from
resident status may not have come to Connecticut as bona fide residents, but
rather simply -to attend its state university. Some within this class, on the
other hand, surely do come with the intention of establishing permanent
43. Id. at 647 n.13.
44. Id. at 657 n.9.
45. 412 U.S. at 448.
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residency. Since, as in Stanley, the state can by "reasonable alternative
means" 46 be more precise in its classification-here, in segregating bona fide
residents and there, fit parents-it is bound by the fourteenth amendment to
provide that greater degree of process and individualized treatment, the
higher costs of administering such a system notwithstanding. Again, however, it is not the classification and underlying presumption that are declared
off-limits but only this application of the classification unrefined by an opportunity for individual rebuttal with additional relevant criteria.
A provision of the Federal Food Stamp Act afforded the next occasion for
the conclusive presumption characterization in United States Department of
Agriculture v. Murry. Under the Act a holusehold would be ineligible for
food stamps for the tax period during which one of its members of 18 years
or older is claimed as a dependent by a non-member taxpayer not eligible
himself for stamps, and for the year thereafter. Once more, not in question
is the constitutionality of the purpose arguably served by the exclusionary
measure: to guard against expenditures to the non-needy and thus preserve
funds for those truly in need. The means chosen to implement this end, however, operates on the basis of a conclusive presumption-that households
identified by the provision described above are not needy 4 7-which, for two
reasons, fails to survive constitutional review. First, as concerns the household member listed as a dependent, satisfaction of that individual's needs during the year of tax dependency hardly warrants the conclusion that his needs
require no subsidy in the subsequent year. Secondly, an irrefutable inference
from one member's non-indigent status in the past year to the entire household's during that and the following year plainly partakes of gross imperfection. Congress' highly imprecise separation of the fraudulent from the
needy can thus not be allowed to stand. But the Court's reasoning would
not preclude retention of the present classification provided that it were buttressed by an opportunity for individual rebuttal of the veracity of the underlying presumption in the specific case. On the other hand, since another classification might more cheaply satisfy the announced due process requirements
for greater individualization in determining need, Congress might well opt for
48
a different, more precise means of effectuating the legislative end.
These alternative remedies to due process deficiencies-greater precision
in legislative classification and a broader opportunity to contest the classification at the administrative level-are perhaps elucidated most clearly in
Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, the Court's latest encounter with
the traditionally "disfavored" 49 conclusive presumption. The two school
46. Id. at 451.

47. See 413 U.S. at 511.
48. Cf. id. at 517 n.2 (Stewart, I., concurring).
49. 414 U.S. at 644, quoting Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 446 (1973).
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board rules under review required pregnant teachers to relinquish their positions without pay at four and five months prior to the expected childbirth.
In defending these rules as helping to ensure physically able teachers in the
classroom, the state relied on, according to the Court, a conclusive presumption-that women after four and five months of pregnancy are necessarily
unfit to .teach 5 -which deviates substantially from reality. 51 And by analogous reasoning, the Court found constitutionally defective a rule categorically prohibiting resumption of duties until three months after the child's
birth. Significantly, as if to illustrate the appropriate remedy to these denials
of due process, the LaFleur Court affirmed the validity of a rule which required mothers seeking reinstatement to come forward with evidence of their
fitness. 5 2 The Court noted, however, that individualized determinations of
fitness were not necessarily the only constitutional method of securing the
state's interest in competent and continuous instruction; a regulation more
carefully tailored to the legislative end might well withstand judicial scrutiny. 53 Some imperfection in classification, therefore, would probably be
lawful, though not the amount present in the current rules.
The Scylla and Charybdis of Due Process Review
Although the Court's opinions in these four cases cannot be faulted for
their elucidation of the imprecision of the conclusive presumptions at issue,
they may be criticized for their notable failure to make explicit the considerations triggering conclusive presumption characterization and review in the
first place. As the above synopsis of the conclusive presumption cases indicates, when the Court unearths a conclusive presumption, it is a signal that
the law under review will have to be remedied by making its presumption
rebuttable-or, to be technically more correct, that a rule of law must give
way to a presumption. The Court's announcement that a conclusive presumption is now before it, however, should not be allowed to obscure the
Court's preliminary decision to translate the classification under consideration
into conclusive presumption terms. The Court's attachment of the label of
"conclusive presumption" to the stereotypical underpinnings which explain
the relation between means and end of these legislative enactments, therefore, hardly justifies treating these laws differently from any others, for stereotype and broad comparative generalization are the essence of the classification process by which all laws are generated. Thus, although the laws in
these cases involve conclusive presumptions, so do all laws.
B.

50. 414 U.S. at 647.
51. Id. at 645-46 &n.12.
52. Id. at 650.

53. Id. at 647 n.13.
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If not self-evident, this proposition, which lies at the heart of Chief Justice
Burger's and Justice Rehnquist's dissents in these cases, 5 4 may be confirmed
by reference to a few classifications which the Court has upheld as satisfying
the minimum rationality equal protection test without noting any difficulties
of conclusive presumption. Thus, in Williamson v. Lee Optical Co.,5 5 the
Court affirmed the validity of a law allowing all sellers of ready-to-wear
glasses, but not opticians, -to fit lenses and to duplicate and replace them
without a prescription from an optometrist or ophthalmologist; no attention
was paid the easily-constructed and plainly imperfect conclusive presumption
that all opticians are not competent to perform these tasks. In Railway Express Agency v. New York, 5" a New York City traffic regulation allowing
business vehicle owners to advertise -their own businesses, but not those of
others, by signs on the vehicle received Supreme Court approval as a means
to promote traffic safety; the underlying and obviously imprecise conclusive
presumption, that all vehicle owners advertising another's wares necessarily
create a traffic hazard, was never considered. And, as a final illustration, in
the recent case of Kahn v. Shevin 57 the Court found constitutional a $500
property tax exemption for widows, but not widowers, without consideration
of the implicit irrefutable presumption that all widowers are not in need of
this tax advantage. Again, 'the disadvantage suffered by a group in -the
classification process is easily characterized as a conclusive presumption constitutionally defective because of its overinclusiveness.
The conclusive presumption analytic model thus threatens displacement of
the traditional equal protection review for rationality in comparative generalization-persons in class A are more qualified (or more in need) than those
in class B in the following respect(s), which justifies the classification madein favor of "strict scrutiny" 58 of the overinclusiveness of the disadvantaged
group in terms of the legislative objectives. In the absence, then, of a more
explicit statement by the Court of the criteria informing its use of the conclusive presumption, the Burger-Rehnquist charge that this line of cases represents "nothing less than an attack upon the very notion of lawmaking itself"5 9 cannot be lightly dismissed. Indeed, a potential for arbitrary applica54. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S.
Dep't of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508, 522-27
441, 459-69 (1973); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645,
55. 348 U.S. 483, 488-89 (1955).
56. 336 U.S. 106 (1949).
57. 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
58. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 460 (1973)
senting).
59. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S.
Burger, C.J., dissenting).

632, 657-60 (1974); United States
(1973); Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S.
659-68 (1972).

(Burger, C.J., & Rehnquist, J., dis632, 660 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., &
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tion appears to inhere in this technique which recalls Justice Stewart's evocation elsewhere of a bolt of lightning's random selection of its victims. 0
But if the conclusive presumption is objectionable as a threat to the survival of any classification, however indulgent that classification's review might
be under the equal protection standards inexplicably displaced, it may also
be faulted for an opposite tendency: the conclusive presumption provides
a seemingly ever-available escape route from elevating interests and classifications to fundamental and suspect status, respectively, despite the probable
consistency with precedent and societal significance of doing so. In Bolling
v. Sharpe,6 1 the companion case to Brown v. Board of Education,62 for exam-

ple, the Court might easily have avoided the far-reaching implications of
making race a suspect classification by pursuing a conclusive presumption
tack instead. The Court's reasoning might have been as follows: laws segregating black and white schoolchildren serve the permissible legislative objective of providing optimal educational opportunities -for each child; those
children most able to accelerate in their studies (whites) are grouped together
as are those least able -to accelerate (blacks);63 these laws thus proceed on
an obviously false conclusive presumption, that all blacks lack the ability to
accelerate quickly, and accordingly deny blacks their constitutional rights under the due process clause.
The conclusive presumption technique therefore provides ready access to
a desired result. And most significantly, it allows the Court to eliminate the
law under review with only the narrowest of consequences outside the confines of the case before it. Thus, laws virtually identical to the one invalidated would fall with the latter, but beyond that nothing seems foreclosed.
Far different in its implications would be a decision resting on a declaration
of suspect classification or fundamental interest. The latter would commit
not only the Supreme Court but, perhaps more importantly in light of the
inevitable practical limitations on Supreme Court review, every court in the
land to strict scrutiny in any future case involving the particular classification
or interest given constitutional stature. The Supreme Court might in any
event consistently reproduce ad hoc the advantages of declaring an interest
fundamental or a classification suspect. Nevertheless, by following this onecase-at-a-time tack when a firm commitment to principle is constitutionally
warranted, the Court indefensibly places individual rights in jeopardy in the
tribunals charged with the daily administration of justice. 64
60.
61.
62.
63.
Board
64.

Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring).
347 U.S. 497 (1954).
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Cf. Brief for Attorney General of Florida as Amicus Curiae at 19-20, Brown v.
of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
Compare, e.g., Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973), with Doe v. Norton, 365
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FOR A STILL NEWER EQUAL PROTECTION

By failing to explain the basis for displacing the ostensibly applicable equal
protection standards, the conclusive presumption cases thus invite criticism
from proponents of more lenient and stricter equal protection review alike.
A closer look at the interests and classifications at issue in the four cases,
however, reveals a consistency in the use thus far of the conclusive presumption which, if made express by the Court, would go far to silence both wings
of critics. In this section, I shall suggest such a defense of the Court's
activities by first developing a model to describe this apparent theoretical
consistency in the four cases and then testing the model against the cases
themselves.
A.

An Outline of the Model

Basically, all the decisions may be defended as innovative activity by the
Court in dealing with interests and classifications felt to be too significant or
untrustworthy to be reviewed under the relaxed standard of equal protection
scrutiny, but not significant or untrustworthy enough to qualify for fundamental or suspect status and the accompanying far more rigorous standard
of review. The Court has not, then, under this proposed reading of the cases,
substituted a due process test for the usual equal protection one. Rather,
it has tacitly first addressed the equal protection issue-i.e., which standard
of review, rational relation or strict scrutiny, applies to any law effecting a
deprivation of the interest or classifying along the lines currently under consideration-and in fact decided that the laws in all four cases should be tested
only against the less demanding standard.
The validity of the legislative classification per se, however, does not resolve the constitutionality of its strict application. The second step of this
model, then, is to determine how much process is owed to one thus classified
so that he may prove his deviation from the stereotype justifying the classification. 65 And to answer this, essentially a question of fundamental fairness,
F. Supp. 65 (D. Conn. 1973) (three-judge court), prob. juris. noted sub non. Roe v.

Norton, 415 U.S. 912 (1974) (classification on the basis of legitimacy of birth).
65. The debate among the Justices in Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942),
points toward this analytic framework. Under review was Oklahoma's Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act, which provided for the sterilization of persons found guilty of two
or more felonies involving moral depravity. Justice Douglas, writing for the majority,
discerned a denial of equal protection in the statute's application to two-time grand larcenists and its express exception for habitual embezzlers. Chief Justice Stone, on the
other hand, found fault not in the classification per se, but rather in the opportunity
given those within the class singled out for disadvantage to escape the penalized class:
I think the real question we have to consider is not one of equal protection,
but whether the wholesale condemnation of a class to such an invasion of per-
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the Court in the conclusive presumption cases balanced the burden imposed
by the law on the individual against the burden on the state of providing
more individualized determinations. 66 The Court's conclusion in all four
cases was that the legislative classifications under review were unduly harsh
as presently administered. They required mitigation in the form of a greater
opportunity for individuals within the disadvantaged class to rebut the presumption of lack of qualification or need implicitly made and-as with any
classification-made conclusively.
The central feature of this model is its attention to individual burdens not
deriving from infringement of a fundamental interest or allocated by a suspect classification. The individual burden might be gauged by the significance of the interest affected and the distrust attending the particular classification employed. The former would provide a measure of the seriousness
of the deprivation; hence, the more significant the interest, the greater the
sonal liberty, without opportunity to any individual to show that his is not the
type of case which would justify resort to it, satisfies the demands of due process.
Id. at 544 (Stone, C.J., concurring). Although Justice Douglas made mention of this
possible due process objection, he explicitly bypassed the issue in favor of the equal protection claim. Id. at 538. It remained, then, for Justice Jackson to attempt a reconciliation of the Douglas and Stone positions, and, in doing so, he highlighted the interplay
between equal protection and due process analysis:
I join the Chief Justice in holding that the hearings provided are too limited in the context of the present Act to afford due process of law. I also
agree with the opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas that the scheme of classification
set forth in the Act denies equal protection of the law. I disagree with the
opinion of each in so far as it rejects or minimizes the grounds taken by the
other.
Perhaps to employ a broad and loose scheme of classification would be permissible if accompanied by the individual hearings indicated by the Chief Justice. On the other hand, narrow classification with reference to the end to be
accomplished by the Act might justify limiting individual hearings to the issue
whether the individual belonged to a class so defined. Since this Act does
not present these questions, I reserve judgment on them.
Id. at 546 (Jackson, J., concurring).
66. Cf. United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508, 517-18 (1973)
(Marshall, J., concurring). In reviewing the growing body of literature on these cases
published since the essential completion of this article, I discover the controversiality
of a basic assumption shared by my model and the latter concurring opinion: that the
conclusive presumption cases in fact have a theoretical consistency awaiting elucidation.
Thus, even the recent commentary probably most amenable to my analysis, Note, The
Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1534
(1974), prefers to treat these decisions as fundamentally confused or misguided. See also
Bezanson, Some Thoughts on the Emerging Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine, 7 IND.
L. REV. 644 (1974); Note, The Conclusive Presumption Doctrine: Equal Process or
Due Protection?, 72 MICH. L. REV. 800 (1974). But cf. Sewell, Conclusive Presumptions and/or Substantive Due Process of Law, 27 OKLA. L. REV. 151 (1974).
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demand for individualized determination of the appropriateness (in terms of
promoting legitimate goals) of applying the deprivation to a particular person. The latter factor in the equation would reflect the likelihood that the
deprivation has been wrongly imposed on any individual within the disadvantaged class. As has been argued at length elsewhere, 6 7 the suspicion attending a classification derives from a suspicion of the process by which the classification is generated: may legislators be trusted to make the generalizations
about comparative need or qualification and the cost-benefit balances about
the value of greater precision in classification which inevitably inhere in the
selection of a classification to effectuate legislative ends? 68 The greater the
suspicion of legislative competence to prescribe, therefore, the greater the
possibility of imperfection in classification and, hence, the stronger the claim
of fundamental fairness for more individualized treatment of persons within
the disadvantaged class.
In general, then, the requisite degree of perfection in classification will vary
with the product of these elements of significance in interest and untrustworthiness in classification. Criteria of constitutional significance and untrustworthiness thus remain to be articulated. And in this regard the Court
appears in its conclusive presumption cases to adhere to guidelines provided
by its past equal protection decisions. Thus, as to interests, the Court's thesis seems to be that the Framers designated expressly or by strong implication 9 a select few interests as "fundamental" to a democratic, federal system; 70 other interests acquire a greater or lesser constitutional significance ac67. See Ely, supra note 40, at 933 n.85; Note, supranote 8, at 1250-51.
68. Basically, classifications are least trustworthy when they involve comparative generalizations about two classes of persons, one of which constitutes a majority of the legislature and the other of which lacks both significant representation on the lawmaking
body and ability to make substantial input into legislative decisions by means of lobbying
force. These "we-they" classifications, see Ely, supra note 40, at 933 n.85, are thus sus-

picious because of the personal stake of the "we-group" in skewing the classification in
its favor, coupled with the inability of the "they-group" to voice its claims with enough
political potency to provide a reliable check against the "we-group's" self-serving ten-

dencies. See Note, supra note 8, at 1254-57; p. 231 infra.
69. "Implication" as used here refers to inference from both textual exegesis and the
basic structure of the system. Compare Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 48485 (1965), with Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630 (1969). See generally C.
BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 7-13 (1969).

70. The interests declared fundamental thus far include: interstate travel, Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); voting, Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S.
663 (1966); privacy, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965); freedom of association, Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968);
freedom of speech, Chicago Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972), and Cox V.
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 581 (1965) (Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); and equal access to nondiscretionary criminal appeals, compare Douglas v. Cal-
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cording to the degree to which guaranteeing enjoyment of fundamental
interests depends upon protection of these subsidiary interests. 71 As concerns
classifications, the criterion informing suspect classifications 7 2 -i.e., whether
the law distinguishes between a group represented by a majority of the legislature and another largely excluded from both the legislature and less direct
modes of participation in legislative decisions 7 -may be applied with some
modification: while the focus in suspect classification cases is polar instances
of "outsider" group status, 74 here it would be the relativistic issue of degree
of exclusion from the political process.
ifornia, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), and Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), with Ross
v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
71. Cf. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 102 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
72. The Court has held the following classifications to be suspect: alienage, Graham
v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); nationality, Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S.
81 (1943); and race, Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). The Court has avoided
an explicit statement on the suspect status of classification by legitimacy of birth. Such
a statement in the affirmative, however, would appear to be the logical culmination of
the Court's recent decisions reviewing legitimacy classifications. Thus, in Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968); Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73
(1968); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); and Gomez v. Perez,
409 U.S. 535 (1973), the Court found irrational state laws making a child's illegitimacy
of birth a disqualification for receipt of statutory benefits by the child or mother, or
for state enforcement of paternal support. Movement toward a declaration of suspect
status, furthermore, would appear to be confirmed by the intimation of suspect status
in Weber, supra at 176 n.14, and by the per curiam character of the Gomez opinion.
Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971), however, where the Court upheld a legitimacy classification for purposes of intestate succession from the father, indicates that
this classification may not, in the Court's view, merit strict scrutiny as a suspect classification. The later history of Labine in the Supreme Court is informative in this regard.
Thus, in Weber, the Court underlined the need informing Labine for "prompt and definitive determination of the valid ownership of property left by decedents," Weber, supra at 170, quoting Labine v. Vincent, 229 So. 2d 449, 452 (La. Ct. App. 1969); cf.
Labine, supra at 554-56 (Brennan, J., dissenting). One might infer from this delimitation of Labine by Weber, and from the inattention to Labine in Gomez, that Labine
has been largely discredited. Another explanation of Labine, though, may be that given
the enormous difficulties of discovering the decedent's intent-the ostensible thrust of
intestacy statutes, see E. CLARK, A. GULLIVER, L. LusKy & A. MURPHY, GRATUITOUS
TRANSFERS 55 (1967); Atkinson, Succession Among Collaterals, 20 IowA L. REv. 185,
187-88 (1934)-coupled with the temporal pressures, noted in Weber, to settle the status
of the intestate landowner's property, the imperfect classification by legitimacy under review in Labine constituted the best possible within the time available for formulation.
The intestacy statute thus comported with the demands of strict scrutiny, see note 8 supra, and Labine may be read as consistent with an unspoken understanding on the Court
of the suspect status of classification by legitimacy of birth.
73. See Note, supra note 8, at 1245-48. See also note 68 supra; pp. 24142 infra.
74. Thus, the, Court has found race, alienage, and nationality to be suspect because
in its judgment blacks, aliens, and foreign nationals are demonstrably impotent in the
political process-in effect, "discrete and insular minorities," United States v. Carolene
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Insofar as Professor Gunther's, 75 if not also the Court's, 76 sliding-scale
equal protection model finds its counterpart in the due process phase of the
above model, the crucial difference between the two models and major advantage enjoyed by that implicit in the conclusive presumption cases should
at this point be made clear. Basically, the model underlying these cases represents a more flexible manner of dealing with classifications which affect
significant interests or are untrustworthy in nature. Equal protection review,
whether two-tiered or sliding-scale, requires a court to choose between allowing or denying the legislature the use of the classification under consideration.
Either choice may pose substantial problems. On the one hand, placing the
classification off-limits to the lawmaker altogether will in many instances
prove socially undesirable because the added costs of pursuing the legislative
goal through a different classification may require abandonment in whole or
part of the specific project or of others also worthy of pursuit. On the other
hand, simply indulging legislative employment of the classification may be
troublesome because those individuals disadvantaged by the classification
who lack the goal-related characteristic(s) informing choice of the classification are made to bear an unjust burden.
The model present in the conclusive presumption cases offers a middle
ground between these polar options of equal protection review and thus a
means to mitigate the social and individual complications attending the ei.ther/or choice presented by equal protection review. Using this approach,
a court allows the legislature to retain the existing classification. 7 7 The state
must, however, to ensure constitutionality in application, bear the costs of allowing persons adversely affected by the classification to come forward with
proof of considerations indicating the legislature's failure to promote the goals
central to the law by disadvantaging them. The legislature may, on the other
hand, decide to abandon the original classification if it finds excessive the
costs of providing individuals within the disadvantaged class this opportunity
to demonstrate the appropriateness of exempting them from its adverse effect. A more precise classification may in the legislature's estimation provide
a cheaper means to pursue the desired ends, or the project may of course
be left unimplemented in part or whole because of costs made unavoidable
by the court's due process mandate. But in any event the decision whether
or not to continue with the first classification is the legislature's to make and
Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938)-and therefore unable to counter with any
consistency the self-serving tendencies of a legislature in we-they comparisons and costbenefit balances. See Note, supra note 8, at 1257-58 & n.82; note 68 supra.
75. See Gunther, supra note 15.
76. See note 21 supra.
77. See p. 223 supra.
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not, as it indeed is with equal protection review, precluded by the court. This
is not to say that the court has left the cost-benefit balance entirely up to
the legislature, for it has decided that the benefit to the individual from
greater precision in state processes warrants the higher cost borne by the state
to ensure such precision. The court has, though, allowed the legislature
greater leeway in its choice of means within judicially-prescribed limits than
obtains with equal protection review.
This greater flexibility in classification, moreover, is not achieved at the
expense of individual rights, for the court has established requirements of due
process proportional to the significance of the interests affected and the untrustworthiness of the classification created. And, indeed, since courts need
not take the significantly harsher and more interventionist measure of prohibiting the classification altogether in order to protect personal freedoms, one
would suppose that the model underlying the conclusive presumption cases
offers more hope than the sliding-scale equal protection test of consistent
demonstration by the judiciary of solicitude for individual rights.
B.

The Cases Reconsidered

Since the above model attempts to make explicit the constitutional analysis
informing the Court's conclusive presumption cases, demonstration of its validity requires a closer look at the cases themselves. The descriptive accuracy of the model must be decided by an evaluation of the interests and classifications at issue for their significant or untrustworthy nature. While the
earlier discussions of these decisions focused on what the Court does when
it calls something a "conclusive presumption," an attempt will now be made
to explain why the Court found conclusive presumptions to be present in the
four cases in the first place. In general, then, by reconstructing the cases,
I hope to dispel the mist propagated by the invocation of "conclusive presumption," a mist which shrouds considerations central to the Court's decisions.
In Stanley v. Illinois the Court had before it a sex classification, a law
which patently accorded different treatment to parties similarly-situated except for their difference in sex: mothers of illegitimate children retain custody of their children after the father's death; fathers of illegitimate children
lose custody at the mother's death. The interest under consideration was the
parental one in the care and upbringing of one's own offspring. In terms
of -the two-tiered equal protection test, the Court tacitly slotted the instant
law in the lower tier. The Stanley Court thus did not use the conclusive presumption technique to avoid deciding whether the classification at issue was
suspect or the interest fundamental; rather, it implicitly decided both ques-
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tions in the negative. At the time, sex was not among the small group of
classifications declared suspect by the Court 78 and, in retrospect,7 9 seems not
to have been a classification which the Court had elevated to suspect status
sub silentio.8 0 And custody of one's offspring, though related to the constitutional right to privacy announced in Griswold v. Connecticut,8s was apparently not regarded as fundamental itself. Confirmation of this point lies in
the Court's opinion in Eisenstadt v. Baird,s 2 decided in the same term as
Stanley, where the majority emphasized its dissatisfaction with a bootstrap
logic that would read Griswold as a basis for the fundamentality of various
personal and familial interests. Tested by a rational connection standard,
therefore, the Illinois law easily passed muster: the comparative generaliza78. See note 72 supra.
79. In Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974), the Court upheld a $500 property tax
exemption for widows. This sex classification was plainly imperfect as an embodiment
of the state's goal to subsidize the needy: while most widows may be more needy than
most widowers, surely some widows are not as needy as some widowers. Since the applicable standard of scrutiny for suspect classifications is perfection in classification absent exigent circumstances, see note 8 supra, this classification would have to fall if sex
classifications are suspect. That it survived the Court's scrutiny, then, evidences the
Court's current view that sex is not a suspect classification.
Nor is it of any significance to this conclusion that the law in Kahn ostensibly benefits women, the "they-group" in this classification resting on a we-they (men-women)
comparison of relative need. For the taint of self-interest which, along with the political
impotence of the "they-group" in trying to counter the bias, makes we-they classifications suspect, see notes 68 & 74 supra, is one presumed to inform all classifications
drawn along suspect lines and make them disadvantageous to the "they-group." This
law designed to favor women, therefore, may well rest on a self-serving comparative generalization-we (men) are more intelligent and/or industrious than they (women) are,
and thus are not in need of this tax preference-which stigmatizes women. Although
the Court avoided this reverse discrimination problem when faced with it in DeFunis
v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974), the appropriateness of strict scrutiny for all classifications on the basis of suspect criteria follows from the theory underlying the Court's
past suspect classification cases. See Id. at 336-44 (Douglas, J., dissenting); Note, supra
note 8, at 1260 n.92.
This reading of Kahn, furthermore, draws support from the more recent case of Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974), where the element of disadvantage to some
women was indisputable. There, the Court found "rational" a provision of California's
disability insurance system which failed to compensate female workers for disability related to the normal course of pregnancy. Id. at 495. The plan did compensate men
for male-specific disabilities-prostatectomies and circumcision-and others almost exclusively experienced by men-hemophilia and gout. Id. at 501 (Brennan, Douglas &
Marshall, JJ., dissenting). In terms of the implications of the decision for the status,
suspect or not, of sex classifications in the view of the Court, the dissenters wrote: "The

Court's decision threatens to return men and women to a time when 'traditional' equal
protection analysis sustained legislative classifications that treated differently members
of a particular sex solely because of their sex." Id. at 503.
80. Cf. Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973). See note 72 supra.
81. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
82. 405 U.S. 438, 447 n.7 (1972).
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tion explaining the classification, that a woman alone is more fit than a man
to care for children, is surely at least plausible as a descriptive statement
about modern-day society. Though unacceptable were a suspect classification or fundamental interest present, the law's imprecision-undoubtedly
some men are more qualified than some women for this task-presents no
equal protection complications under the indulgent, lower tier test.
The classification's satisfaction of the due process demand for individual
fairness, however, is judged by a far more discriminating standard. Interests
and classifications are viewed as more or less significant or untrustworthy,
rather than analyzed only for the polar value of fundamentality or suspectness. The highly untrustworthy nature of sex classifications thus becomes
relevant at this point as does the very significant quality of the familial interest implicated. As to the former, since women have long occupied a minority
status on legislatures and have had notably insubstantial input into legislative
decisions through even indirect channels-as witnessed by the great volume of
legislation83 employing an imprecise sex classification to disadvantage8 4 women-the legislative process must be regarded as untrustworthy enough in
classifying by sex that special attention should be paid imperfection in classification. And with regard to the custodial interest involved in Stanley, the Court
has in a long line of decisions recognized the substantiality of such familial
rights,8 5 the absence of legal confirmation of the family bonds notwithstanding.86 Whether or not itself "fundamental" by virtue of its correlation to the
fundamental right of privacy, furthermore, Mr. Stanley's custodial interest is
strongly associated with that latter right and acquires significance by virtue
of that nexus alone. From another perspective, perhaps the security of the
foundational guarantee would be undermined unless solicitude were shown
these satellite freedoms. Silent as to the untrustworthy nature of sex classifications, the Stanley Court did review the relevant authority and affirm the
"cognizable and substantial"8 7 quality of the interest affected. But the Court
did leave the causal relationship between its finding of an unusually significant interest and its recourse to conclusive presumption theory unhappily
blurred-unhappily, that is, because the Court's exacting review of the overinclusiveness of the Illinois law becomes eminently defensible, far less vul83. See generally Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973)

(plurality opinion);

L. KANOWICZ, WOMEN AN) ThE LAW: THE UNFINISHED REVOLUTION (1969).
84. On disadvantage and compensatory legislation, see note 79 supra.
85. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158 (1944); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
86. See, e.g., Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
87. 405 U.S. at 652.

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 24:217

nerable to charges of arbitrariness and avoidance, once the two-step analysis of relevant interest and classification articulated above is made explicit.
In Vlandis v. Kline, the Court is even less helpful in elucidating the source
of its close scrutiny of the classification. And given the Court's obviousand two Justices' acknowledged 8 8 -effort to frame the relevant issue to avoid
deciding the larger issue of the implications of the fundamental right to travel
for tuition residency laws, Vlandis appears to promise to be less defensible
than Stanley. Justice White's concurrence, however, offers an insight into
the case which may help explain the Vlandis Court's conclusive presumption tack as other than an embodiment of caprice: the Connecticut
law unconstitutionally circumscribes appellees' right to an education a 9 As
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez9" had very recently
made clear, the Court did not view this right as fundamental. No more
than review for rationality would thus obtain under the equal protection
clause, and the correlation of recent out-of-state residence with lack of intent
to establish permanent in-state residence is, however rough, at least true
enough to supply the modicum of plausibility required. But even if Rodriguez has deprived Brown v. Board of Education9 1 of whatever authority it
may have offered for education's fundamentality-and my reading of Brown,
which focused on equal educational opportunities and left any mention of
"suspect classification" to its companion case Boiling v. Sharpe,9 2 finds this
authority quite impressive-Brown stands nonetheless as an affirmation of
the powerful significance of that interest.9 3 And insofar as deprivations of
education, whether at the grade school or higher levels, may profoundly limit
one's ability to exercise effectively and meaningfully the fundamental freedoms of speech and petition, state-imposed burdens on individual access to
educational institutions should only reasonably come under close judicial
scrutiny. In Vlandis, then, the Court was mindful that an applicant's ability
to qualify for the substantially lower in-state tuition might be determinative
of his ability to secure a higher education. Intensifying its standard of review
to comport with the magnitude of the jeopardized interest, the Court required
Connecticut to provide more individualized treatment for those denied "resident" status than would be expected with regulation of less significant interests.
88. 412 U.S. at 455 (Marshall & Brennan, JJ., concurring).
89. Id. at 459 (White, J., concurring).
90. 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973).
91. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
92. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
93. See also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sweezy v. New Hampshire,
354 U.S. 234 (1957); McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
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Justification for the Court's invocation of conclusive presumption theory
in United States Department of Agriculture v. Murry follows a similar line
of reasoning. Again the triggering factor is an interest which the Court has
denied inclusion among the select ranks of the fundamental, but accorded
notable deference presumably because of its close nexus to fundamental freedoms. Thus, a right to subsistence may be the driving force behind the
Murry opinion. The Court has not treated this right as fundamental: avowedly testing for only rationality in classification, the Court has confirmed the
validity of laws providing some persons, but denying others, the means to acquire the basic necessities of food and shelter 94 as well as laws burdening
by their operation the ability of some people to sustain themselves. 95 Accordingly, the law in Murry, though depriving some individuals of subsistence, need be only a rational means to promote a lawful objective in order
to survive equal protection scrutiny. Rational, within the meaning of the
two-tiered test, it surely is: Congress has taken aim at abuses of the food
stamp program with a classification admittedly sweeping in its exclusionary
thrust, but, as the Rehnquist dissent details, 9 6 no more so than traditionally
allowed.
Goldberg v. Kelly97 is evidence, however, that the Court has not been
wholly unimpressed by the seriousness of deprivations of this sort. It has
accorded great weight to a person's interest in satisfying his and his family's
most elementary needs. 8 Studies correlating nutritional levels with degree
of political activity99 confirm, furthermore, that this sustenance interest is inextricably linked to enjoyment of the fundamental political freedoms of
speech and petition. 10 0 And as the Court acknowledged in Shapiro v.
Thompson,' 0 ' the fundamental right of travel may be profoundly qualified
by inadequate governmental deference to this interest. The significance of
the interest affected by Congress' discrimination among potential food stamp
recipients, therefore, provides a sound rationale for the Murry Court's firm
94. See Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S.
78 (1971); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970). See also Developments in the
Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1191-92 (1969).
95. See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137
(1971).
96. 413 U.S. at 525-27 (Rehnquist & Powell, JJ., & Burger, C.J., dissenting).
97. 397 U.S. 254 (1970), especially at 264.
98. See also Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 340-42 (1969); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 (1969).
99. See generally A. KEYs, THE BIOLOGY OF HUMAN STARVATION (1950).
100. See Simson, Another View of Rawls's Theory of Justice, 23 EMORY L.J. 473,
488-89 (1974).

101. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
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demand for individual fairness in determinations of need and its rigorous examination of the overinclusiveness of the exclusionary measure.
Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur probably represents the Court's
most explicit approximation to the analytic model expounded in this article.
In LaFleur, the Court again failed to elucidate the first, equal protection step
of the model. The Court was far less tenuous here than in the other cases,
however, in associating its recourse to the exacting standard of conclusive presumption review with the presence of an interest or classification of special
significance or untrustworthiness. The Court began its exposition by affirming the importance under the due process clause of the right to bear children,
a right burdened by the school board regulations at issue insofar as the latter
penalized the teacher for its exercise. In terms of the model, this due process inquiry presupposed that laws infringing upon the right to procreate do
not invoke strict equal protection scrutiny. The LaFleur Court implicitly
reached the decision, therefore, that the individual's interest in procreation
is not fundamental; and, indeed, authority is not wanting in the Court's past
10 2
decisions for the non-fundamental status of this interest. In Buck v. Bell,
a decision approved by the Court as recently as the abortion cases,' 03 the
Court upheld the state's power to deprive feeble-minded persons of their ability to procreate. Fundamental interest analysis and review could not have
been more foreign to the Court's opinion: minimizing the seriousness of this
deprivation-a "lesser sacrifice," 10 4 according to Justice Holmes' majority
opinion-the Court virtually scoffed at petitioner's equal protection attack on
the patent underinclusiveness of the measure. 10 5 A more contemporary
statement on the fundamentality of procreation is Dandridge v. Williams.'0 6
There the Court found to be appropriately "rationally based"' 0 7 a measure
designed to discourage procreation by a maximum welfare grant regulation
which failed to take family size into account beyond five dependents in determining need. The law's inhibiting effect on procreation notwithstanding,
therefore, lower tier scrutiny was applied. If equal protection thus requires
no more than that the school board regulations in LaFleurnot burden procreation irrationally, their validity should not be in doubt, for firm cut-off and
return dates undeniably do serve the state's goals of continuity and competence in instruction in a manner no more crude than typically allowed.
102. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
103. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973).
104. 274 U.S. at 207.
105. Id. at 208 ("[i]t is the usual last resort of constitutional arguments to point out
shortcomings of this sort").
106. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
107. Id. at 487.
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On the other hand, the general acceptability of a classification does not

settle the constitutional parameters of its application. The latter must be decided by a flexible due process inquiry which looks beyond the non-fundamental status of any right to bear children to that right's relative significance
on the spectrum of democratic values. And a finding of its near-fundamental
stature would seem to be compelled: in terms of precedent, Skinner v. Oklahoma,'0 8 where the Court seized upon the state's distinction among types of
felons in its sterilization law to void this measure jeopardizing "one of the
basic civil rights of man,"' 10 9 witnesses the Court's substantial deference to
individual enjoyment of this right; and with regard to the interaction between
procreation and fundamental interests, the right to bear offspring, like the
custodial interest in Stanley, bears an intimate relation to the guarantee of
privacy. The LaFleur Court's close scrutiny, under the guise of conclusive
presumption, of classifications discouraging enjoyment of this interest was
thus appropriate as a matter of individual fairness."10 As in the preceding
conclusive presumption cases, however, the Court's invocation of this exacting
review for overinclusiveness could not be justified by the artificial tactic of
discovering a conclusive presumption. Rather, compelling vindication lay in
express articulation of the considerations which prompted the Court in each
case to take the mystifying detour of "conclusive presumption" to arrive at
its predetermined destination.
108. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
109. Id. at 541.
110. Further support for the LaFleur Court's demand for more individualized determinations may lie in the untrustworthy nature of the classification. Thus, although the
Court made no attempt to elucidate this possible impetus to conclusive presumption theory, a sex classification-an untrustworthy, if not suspect, species, see p. 235 & note
79 supra-may be discerned: the law singles out women for disadvantage on the basis
of a sex-specific disability, but fails to lay down guidelines for the effect of sex-specific
disabilities on the work allowed male teachers.
With regard to the post-birth regulations in LaFleur, male-specific disabilities such as
prostatectomies and circumcision would seem analogous to a women's pregnancy: regulations establishing a mandatory non-return period after suffering these male-specific disabilities would operate on the same principle. Close examination of the post-birth regulations as sex classifications would thus seem appropriate. Cf. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417
U.S. 484, 501-03 (1974) (Brennan, Douglas & Marshall, JJ., dissenting). But cf. id.
at 496-97 n.20.
On the other hand, if no comparable male disabilities in fact exist, the school board
regulations cannot properly be characterized as sex classifications. Thus, insofar as the
pre-birth regulations single out pregnancy for special treatment because of the generally
predictable nature of its course, these regulations may lack a true analogue in male disabilities. Basically, they would seem to be only disability classifications, ones distinguishing between different types of disabilities in order to serve the legislative goals. Cf.

Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 653 n.2 (1974) (Powell, J.,
concurring).
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QUALIFYING THE COURT'S SUCCESS

If this account of the Court's activities under the rubric of "conclusive pre-

sumption" is accurate,"' the Court has developed an analytic model with
111. A theory drawn from cases in which the Court relied on a conclusive presumption rationale may not adequately explain all cases in which the Court arguably might
have decided in terms of conclusive presumption but did not. Since the Court's use of
conclusive presumption still appears to be in its experimental stages, this lack of theoretical consistency in noninvocation of the doctrine would not be surprising. Nevertheless,
at least the two occasions on which conclusive presumption has not been employed as the
basis of decision, but has figured prominently in the Court's or a dissenting Justice's
opinion, are explicable in terms of the model outlined in this article..
In Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 376-77 (1973), the
Court briefly disposed of the claim, accepted by the Fifth Circuit, see Mourning v.
Family Publications Serv., Inc., 449 F.2d 235 (5th Cir. 1971), that the Four Installment
Rule promulgated by the Federal Reserve Board constitutes a conclusive presumption violative of due process. This regulation implementing the Truth in Lending Act requires
that a creditor make certain disclosures whenever he offers credit to a consumer "for
which either a finance charge is or may be imposed or which pursuant to an agreement,
is or may be payable in more than four installments."
12 C.F.R. § 226.2(k) (1972).
As Chief Justice Burger's opinion for the Court noted, this regulation was promulgated
to combat the practice of hiding a finance charge in the price of goods sold. 411 U.S.
at 366.
The Fifth Circuit made itself an obvious target for reversal when it held the regulation constitutionally defective because "'[t]he presence of a finance charge is conclusively presumed from the nature of the transaction, involving payment in more than four
installments." 449 F.2d at 241. The regulation establishes no such presumption.
Rather, all that it conclusively presumes is that transactions meeting the four installment
criterion better lend themselves to covert violations of disclosure requirements than do
other transactions, and thus comprise an appropriate focus for deterrent efforts. In reversing, the Court essentially so argued. See 411 U.S. at 377.
In terms of the analysis suggested in this article, the Court is almost certainly right.
The classification among types of creditors lacks any markings of suspicion, and the interest affected-relative freedom in business operations from government regulationfalls notably short of constitutional magnitude. In sum, since the regulation is obviously
a rational attempt to deal with the evasion problem presented, see id. at 374, equal protection is satisfied; and the nature of the classification and interest at issue warrant the
conclusion that due process requires no opportunity to rebut the presumption inherent
in the regulation.
Conclusive presumption is also discussed at some length in Justice Marshall's dissent
in Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417 (1974). In Marshall, the Court upheld Title
II of the Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Act of 1966, 18 U.S.C. §§ 4251-55 (1970),
which makes addicts with two or more prior felony convictions ineligible for rehabilitative commitment in lieu of a prison term for a new crime, however nonviolent. Justice
Marshall's dissent, joined by Justices Douglas and Brennan, attacked the law for various
constitutional inadequacies, including its incorporation of "a conclusive and irrebuttable
presumption that a person with two or more felony convictions is not likely to be rehabilitated through treatment." 414 U.S. at 435.
In arguing that such a presumption is disfavored "particularly .
where an interest
as important as personal liberty is at stake," id., the dissent is predicating its conclusive
presumption tack on the type of sliding-scale due process analysis suggested in this article. Justice Marshall is overstating the significance of the interest at issue, however,
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much to commend it. As an alternative to the sliding-scale equal protection
test also of apparent recent origin in the Court, this two-step approach to legislative classifications is attractive in its flexibility. Celebration of this attempt to resolve problems not satisfactorily dealt with under the equal protection clause, however, must proceed with appropriate recognition of a potential
for abuse in this model which would not be eliminated by the model's express
adoption by the Court: employment of this mode of analysis as a substitute
for adding new interests and classifications to the ranks of the fundamental
and suspect' 12 despite the constitutional basis for doing so. If interests and
classifications qualify for strict equal protection scrutiny, it is not enough to
review for fundamental fairness, the second step of the model; the first step
must be taken with no less seriousness than before the evolution of this useful
device for handling interests and classifications of variable significance and
untrustworthiness. For allowing the legislature to continue using the original
classification and requiring the individual to come forward with preponderant
proof of specific unfairness in application-the remedy where equal protection is satisfied but due process is not--does burden the individual and his
or her freedoms. And it is the essence of the equal protection doctrines of
suspect classification and fundamental interest to relieve individuals of any
such burdens.
In this regard, I should add that my account of the Court's implicit decisions in the conclusive presumption cases that the interests and classifications
at issue were not fundamental or suspect should not be read as indicating
my agreement with those decisions. In particular, I question the Court's approach to sex classifications," 3 for the latter do appear to bear the indicia
of suspicion informing the Court's suspect classification cases: they are the
result of comparative generalizations and cost-benefit balances regarding a
group comprising a majority in lawmaking bodies (men) and a group traditionally excluded in the extreme from both formal and informal input into
legislative decisions (women).1 4 By the doctrine of suspect classification,
the Court has extended great protection to persons within such "outsider"
for the liberty involved is not the difference between imprisonment and free intercourse
in society but, instead, between confinement in a prison and confinement in a narcotics
treatment facility. And since the classification is drawn along lines not especially untrustworthy-narcotic addicts with less than two prior felony convictions/addicts with
two or more-the Court's failure to require more process for the excluded addict by taking a conclusive presumption route is understandable in terms of the proposed model.
112. See notes 70 & 72 supra.
113. See pp. 233-35 & notes 79 & 110 supra. Compare Frontiero v. Richardson, 411
U.S. 677 (1973), and Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), with Geduldig v. Aiello, 417
U.S. 484 (1974), and Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
114. See p. 231 & notes 73 & 74 supra.
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groups from these "we-they" classifications; the classification fails, except under extraordinary circumstances, unless the state can demonstrate its perfection.115 If women are entitled to this measure of protection from unjust discrimination, then, it is plainly no adequate substitute to require each individual woman who feels injured by a sex classification to bear the monetary and
emotional costs of trying to demonstrate the unfairness of the classification
in her case. For purposes of this article, further pursuit of my differences
with the Court's analysis of sex classifications is probably best deferred. I
raise the issue here, however, to illustrate what I perceive to be the principal
pitfall of a basically sound approach.
With this reservation, then, I offer the model described at length above
as a major innovation by the Court in reconciling the competing demands
of the classification process to minimize the state's costs in pursuing lawful
goals and to maximize fairness to individuals. The time is long overdue,
therefore, for the Court to lift the veil of "conclusive presumption" off of its
creation and put its workings on display for much-deserved attention by
courts and critics.

115. See note 8 supra.

